On November 20, 2025, the House Africa Subcommittee of the United States Congress heard live video testimony from a Christian mother who had watched Muslim Fulani militiamen deliberately burn her five children to death during one of their countless raids into Nigeria’s North Central region. Before the hearing had even ended, she was receiving death threats.
The hearing followed U.S. President Donald Trump’s October 31, 2025, designation of Nigeria – Africa’s most populous nation, with 240 million inhabitants – as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) under the 1998 International Religious Freedom Act. Rep. Chris Smith, the subcommittee’s chairman, summed up the situation bluntly: Nigeria is now the most dangerous country in the world in which to live as a Christian.
In fact, it is one of the most dangerous countries in which to live, period. Millions of Nigerians languish in camps for internally displaced people. They have been driven there by the deliberate, sustained, and targeted destruction of many communities and by the abduction, rape, and gruesome killing of Christians, as well as Muslims who are not of Fulani heritage or who otherwise reject jihadist ideology.
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This suffering takes place at the hands of militant Muslim Fulani herders and various other extremely violent Islamist groups, such as Boko Haram and the Islamic State. Saying so is neither Islamophobia nor political hyperbole; it is the harsh truth. For too long, Western governments and media have downplayed the scale and gravity of the violence, casting it as a farmer-herder conflict over land and grazing, driven by climate change and resource competition. Nigerian President Bola Tinubu takes a similar line, insisting that the violence stems from terrorism and banditry that affect Christians and Muslims alike, and rejecting claims of religious persecution.
Others incorrectly claim that more Muslims are dying at the hands of these groups than Christians are, as if this would somehow make these atrocities less objectionable for the latter. Another favourite politically correct line is that “experts say the situation is more complicated”. Indeed, it is, if one refuses to see the religious-ideological motivation that propels these jihadist groups into action as they pursue both their ethnic and economic agendas, including cattle theft and land seizure.
The denial and obfuscation of these realities fit neatly into a secular Western narrative that likes to portray Christians in Africa and the Middle East as unfortunate holdovers from the dark era of European colonialism. Although academic and statistical research, along with on-the-ground evidence from respected NGOs, has repeatedly debunked these falsehoods, most policymakers in Europe and North America refuse to take note of what is really happening and why.
Recently, however, the Nigerian government has begun to recognise the violence caused by militant Muslim Fulani herders, largely due to pressure from the U.S. administration, on which it relies for military aid. Previously, its focus had mostly been on combating Boko Haram and other jihadist groups in the north of the country.
A study released by the Observatory for Religious Freedom in Africa (ORFA) offers a carefully researched, detailed analysis of killings, abductions and related violence in Nigeria from 2020 to 2025. It makes for sobering reading. Most of the killings and attacks, it shows, are carried out not by Boko Haram or other jihadist groups in the far north, as many in the West assume, but by Muslim Fulani militants raiding Nigeria’s breadbasket, the Middle Belt.
The terror perpetrated there is mostly of an ethno-religious nature and follows a clearly identifiable ideological script, as the study describes in detail. This is why, in addition to Christians, who are deliberately targeted, Muslims – often Hausa – who do not publicly adhere to the ideology propagated by the militant Muslim Fulani or do not share their ethnicity are also violently persecuted.
The mere fact that both Muslims and Christians are targeted does not diminish the gravity of the situation for either group or for the country as a whole. Neither does it diminish the clear religious dimension of the persecution, which inspires the targeting of both groups. In addition, persecution plays out differently for the two groups of victims, especially in the vast abduction industry.
What is happening and why
Nigeria’s north, the historical heart of the Sokoto Caliphate, is majority Muslim; the south is majority Christian, with mixed regions in between. The Fulani, a largely pastoralist people, are spread across much of the Sahel. Nigeria has both the largest Muslim and the largest Christian populations in Africa, almost evenly split: 46.9 per cent Muslim and 45.7 per cent Christian.
As outlined in the Open Doors 2026 World Watch List, three of Nigeria’s regions are most affected by persecution and violence. The first is the North East, where Boko Haram and ISWAP (the local Islamic State branch) operate in the porous border areas with Niger, Chad and Cameroon.
In the North West, armed bandit groups pose the main threat. These are increasingly ethno-religious in nature, often of Fulani descent, and are also spilling into neighbouring countries. Evidence has recently emerged that some of these groups are now in league with cross-border jihadist networks, financed, among other means, through abductions for ransom, a practice from which all Nigerians suffer.
Then there is the North Central region (not to be confused with the Middle Belt, which includes much of the North Central region but also other states). It is here that militant Muslim Fulani violence against both Christians and non-aligned Muslims is most widespread and brutal.
An important and much-overlooked factor that runs through all of this and intensifies the violence is the staggering scale of corruption in Nigeria. Because ethnicity and religion consistently play a major role in Nigerian politics, and because winning aligned votes is crucial to securing influence for one’s group, state and federal politicians play the ethnic and religious card without restraint. This mixes with the toxic battle over the spoils of the country’s vast oil wealth and the distribution of lucrative government jobs.
Since its founding in 1978, the Izala movement, a Salafi reform group, has increasingly shaped or inspired the agendas of various jihadist groups, including Boko Haram, ISWAP, Ansaru (aligned with al-Qaeda), Lakurawa (connected to both al-Qaeda and ISWAP), and Mahmuda (a bandit-jihadist group). This movement has also influenced the Muslim Fulani militants.
One element of jihadist ideology that is often deliberately ignored is the distinction between “Dar al-Islam” and “Dar al-Harb” – the “Abode of Islam” and the “Abode of War”. The first refers to territory already under Islamic rule, such as the northern Nigerian states that have introduced Sharia law over the past two decades. The second refers to territory that, in the jihadists’ view, has yet to be subjugated – including Nigeria’s mixed Christian-Muslim areas or majority Christian southern regions.
Recently, a former European government minister who has travelled extensively in Nigeria and the wider region described the spread of both formal and de facto Sharia-based governance. Nigeria’s constitution recognises a limited role for Islamic personal law and Sharia courts. Since the early 2000s, however, formal Sharia has been codified in 12 northern Nigerian states and extended to criminal law. Increasingly, it is also being imposed as a form of parallel rule by jihadist actors in parts of North Central Nigeria, gradually displacing the authority of the Nigerian state.
This process overlaps with the consistent territorial advance of militant Muslim Fulani groups and the resulting forced displacement of Christian communities. Whether a unified Fulani strategy of Islamisation is at work here remains disputed, but there are reasonable grounds to examine whether at least some of these developments form part of a broader agenda.
The growth, increasing technological sophistication and regional and global interconnection of all these groups, including their cooperation with criminal networks across Africa’s Sahel region and beyond, have long been in the making. We now also see their well-organised expansion towards West Africa’s coastal states, such as Benin, Togo, Ivory Coast and Ghana.
This steadily growing phenomenon affects people of all religions in this part of Africa, but the ideologically motivated targeting of Christians forms part of a comprehensive jihadist strategy. The 2026 Open Doors report states:
“Militants attacked predominantly Christian villages in several northern states, killing, raping and abducting people, destroying churches and other buildings as well as harvests or occupying farmlands and even communities. In recent years, the steady influx of Fulani militants from neighbouring countries has added to the threat of violence. Violence has spread to southern Nigerian states too.”
What the numbers show
The ORFA report dissects in meticulous detail how the killings and abductions have developed in each region of Nigeria. During the reporting period, from 2019 to 2025, 79,323 people were killed in persecution-related violence, 42,033 of them civilians. Of these murdered civilians, 28,551 were Christians, 13,224 were Muslims, and the remainder were from indigenous groups.
Militant Muslim Fulani groups were responsible for the largest share of civilian deaths, 44 per cent, followed by unidentified terror groups at 32 per cent. Boko Haram and ISWAP combined were responsible for 12 per cent of the killings. These figures, which reflect only part of the extensively researched data and exclude countless unreported killings, are telling. Most notably, they reveal the outsized role of groups other than Boko Haram and ISWAP, which together account for 88 per cent of civilian deaths. Of particular concern is the role of militant Muslim Fulani groups in the North Central region and the Middle Belt, along with the disproportionately high number of Christians affected overall.
The report also shows that Nigerian security forces left the worst-affected regions vulnerable by concentrating their operations on the North West and North East regions. This raises the question of why the regions most affected by the terror (North Central and the Middle Belt) and the religious group most affected (Christians) seem to receive the least protection from Nigeria’s federal security forces. (Nigeria has no organised local police forces.)
This brings us back to President Trump’s 2025 CPC designation, which addresses this problem directly. In July 2026, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the State Department’s fiscal 2027 appropriations bill, which would withhold 100 per cent of U.S. assistance to Nigeria’s federal government until the State Department certifies that the government in Abuja has established measurable security and protection systems for vulnerable communities, including those in the Middle Belt.
This suggests little confidence in the Nigerian government’s ability or willingness to act decisively.
To illustrate how the jihadist groups themselves treat Christians and Muslims differently, the ORFA report examines in depth the abduction of civilians of all religions, which has long been rampant in Nigeria. During the reporting period, 34,917 civilians were abducted, roughly evenly divided between Christians (slightly more) and Muslims, with a small number from indigenous groups as well.
The report also describes in detail an egregious practice that is rarely discussed or reported: a structured captivity system, run by Muslim Fulani militias, in which religion largely determines how abductees are treated.
“Muslim abductees are generally spared routine beatings and sexual violence … whereas Christian captives face systematic physical abuse, sexual violence, and psychological terror, including being forced to witness killings. This disparity extends to ransom practices: Muslim civilians are often released after shorter negotiations for lower sums, while Christian families face higher demands, broken agreements, and cases where relatives are killed even after full payment.”
The killings and abductions show no sign of slowing, according to the International Society for Civil Liberties and Rule of Law (commonly known as Intersociety), a Nigerian NGO. From January to October 2026, Fulani groups and jihadists murdered at least 3,426 Christians and abducted 3,395 in Nigeria. More than 400 churches were also attacked in the same period – many of them burned to the ground.
To put this in perspective: Since Boko Haram’s jihadist violence began in 2009 and spread with the help of other groups, an estimated 19,810 Christian churches have been attacked or destroyed in Nigeria alone. According to the report, Nigeria accounts for 65 per cent of Christians killed in Africa today.
Why it matters geopolitically
Ignoring or downplaying the persecution of Christians in Nigeria and beyond, which is at least partly religiously motivated, does nothing for its victims. Nor does it help the Muslims who suffer the same fate, also for religious reasons, or the country as a whole.
As history has shown, inaction in the face of such large-scale violence against any religious or ethnic group in a country or region almost invariably leads to a worsening security situation for all. We need only look to Iraq and Syria to see what happens when a genocide – in that case, against Christians and Yazidis – is allowed to unfold.
The consequences are well known: widespread death; increased and lasting regional instability; terror attacks around the world; and massive economic disruption, especially for the Muslim majority in these and neighbouring countries. Today, the Middle East remains a highly volatile region where various Sunni and Shiite terror groups and militias continue to wreak havoc, including on their fellow Muslims, as Hamas and the Houthis demonstrate.
At the same time, the ongoing violence by jihadist groups and Fulani militants in Nigeria is profoundly destabilising the country and its neighbouring regions. This situation is increasingly linked to a calculated effort by certain groups – connected both to global Islamist terror movements and to international organised crime networks – to establish an open route from the Sahel into North Africa and ultimately to Europe.
The likely result is not only more crime, human trafficking and uncontrolled illegal mass migration northward, but also the obvious dangers posed by the growing mobility, interconnectedness and boldness of globalising Islamist terror groups that operate from the African continent and that have no love for democracy and peace.
What happens next depends on international pressure
Recent Nigerian presidents and their administrations have steadily worked to push Christians out of high offices of state. President Tinubu, in office since 2023 and up for re-election in January 2027, has begun to reverse this trend, though only partially. Restoring Nigeria’s constitutional order, which requires proportionate representation of Christians and Muslims in the federal administration and in the security apparatus, is key to combating the violent persecution of both Christians and Muslims in Nigeria.
Equally important, and to be overseen by independent international institutions, is an official fact-finding mission to be deployed to Nigeria, especially the Middle Belt, to produce well-documented evidence that the Nigerian justice system can then use to arrest and prosecute the perpetrators. Given the apparent weakness of local justice systems, international assistance could be provided, including the possibility of the United Nations Security Council approving the creation of a special tribunal.
Unfortunately, international recognition of the crisis in Nigeria remains limited. No progress will be possible without, first, the political will to act and, as a result, a clear and unified public recognition of the problem. That recognition will have to come not only from the U.S., through the CPC designation, but also from the European Union, the African Union and the UN Security Council. The latter, however, is unlikely to act on Nigeria, given that two of its permanent members, Russia and China, have major military, economic and financial interests in the region, for example, in mining. Russia, meanwhile, is extending its military footprint through the Africa Corps (formerly the Wagner Group), with new bases where the West has been downsizing or winding down its security involvement in Africa.
The record suggests that outside pressure is what moves Abuja. The government began to turn its attention to the Fulani militants only after Washington pushed it to, and the House-passed appropriations bill reflects little confidence that it would act decisively of its own accord. If that pressure is sustained and widens beyond Washington, the Nigerian government may well do more to protect vulnerable communities, and the rampage, killings and abductions could begin to ease.
However, if major powers and international institutions do not hold the Nigerian government and its partners consistently to account for making the efforts required to end the growing persecution and violence, these will soon spread northward, along with their jihadist ideological underpinnings, and make their way to Europe.
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Christiaan Alting von Geusau
Christiaan Alting von Geusau worked as an attorney at international law firms Houthoff in Amsterdam and AKD in Brussels (1996-2004), then in Vienna, first as General Counsel & Chief Development Officer (2004-2014) and subsequently as President and Rector (2014-2023) of ITI Catholic University.
Editorial note: GalaxyTV has not fact-checked the article’s claims, figures, dates, or political assertions. This piece first appeared here.

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